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Abstract
Several errors in Stapp’s interpretation of quantum me-
chanics and its application to mental causation (Henry
P. Stapp, “Quantum theory and the role of mind in na-
ture,” e-Print quant-ph/0103043, to appear in Founda-
tions of Physics) are pointed out. An interpretation of
(standard) QM that avoids these errors is presented.
1 INTRODUCTION
According to some theorists [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8], con-
sciousness is needed for making sense of quantum me-
chanics (QM). According to others [9, 10, 11, 12, 13], QM
is needed in order to understand consciousness and/or ac-
count for its causal efficacy. In a recent contribution to
this journal, Henry P. Stapp [14] argues for both: Con-
sciousness is essential for understanding QM, and QM
is essential for the causal efficacy of consciousness. In
the present article I point out a number of errors that
mar Stapp’s theory—inconsistencies, fallacies, and con-
clusions founded on such logical mistakes,—and offer an
interpretation of (standard) QM that avoids these errors.
In addition I outline an alternative account of mental
causation [15, 16].
Section 2 stresses the fact that an algorithm for as-
signing probabilities to the possible results of possible
measurements cannot also represent an evolving state of
affairs (Stapp’s first error, E1). The introduction of con-
sciousness into discussions of QM (E2) serves no other
purpose than to provide gratuitous solutions to a pseudo-
problem arising from E1. Stapp’s third error (E3), pointed
out in Sec. 3, is a category mistake. It consists in his
treating possibilities as if they possessed an actuality of
their own. This leads to the erroneous notion that possi-
bilities are things (“propensities”) that exist and evolve
in time (E4).
Stapp offers two arguments purporting to support the
existence of a dynamically preferred family of constant-
time hypersurfaces. The first invokes astronomical data,
which support the existence of a historically preferred
family of hypersurfaces but not of a dynamically pre-
ferred one (E5). The second is fallacious because it in-
volves inconsistent combinations of (individually valid)
counterfactuals (E6). Equally fallacious, therefore, is
Stapp’s “proof” of the occurrence of faster-than-light
transfers of information (E7). This is discussed in Sec. 4.
According to Stapp, granting free will to experimenters
leads to a physical reality inconsistent with the “block
universe” of special relativity (SR), a reality that unfolds
in response to choices. This is one (E8) of a cluster of
misconceptions arising from the erroneous notion that
the experiential now, and the temporal distinctions that
we base on it, have anything to do with the physical
world (E9). Objectively, the past, the present, and the
future exist in exactly the same atemporal sense. There
is no such thing as “an evolving objective physical world”
(E10), and there is no such thing as an objectively open
future or an objectively closed past (E11). The results of
performed measurements are always “fixed and settled.”
What is objectively open is the results of unperformed
measurements. This is discussed in Sec. 5.
The subject of causation is broached in Sec. 6. Causal-
ity, as Hume [17] discovered two and a half centuries ago,
lies in the eye of the beholder. While classical physics per-
mits the anthropomorphic projection of causality into the
physical world with some measure of consistency, quan-
tum physics does not. Trying to causally explain the
quantum-mechanical correlations is putting the cart in
front of the horse. It is the correlations that explain why
causal explanations work to the extent they do. Stapp’s
attempt to involve causality at a more fundamental level
(E12) depends crucially on his erroneous view that the
factual basis on which quantum-mechanical probabilities
are to be assigned is determined by Nature rather than
by us (E13).
Sections 7 to 9 are of a more constructive nature. In
Sec. 7 the significance of the existence of objective prob-
abilities is discussed. They betoken an objective indef-
initeness that is crucial for the stability of matter, and
they imply the extrinsic nature of the values of quantum-
mechanical observables. Extrinsic properties presuppose
intrinsic ones, and this implies the co-existence of two
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logically distinct domains. How these are related to each
other is discussed in Sec. 8. Section 9 gets to the heart of
QM, which concerns the spatiotemporal differentiation of
reality. The fact that this is finite makes QM as incon-
sistent with a fundamental assumption of field theory as
SR is with absolute simultaneity. Stapp shares this erro-
neous assumption when he considers the physical world
differentiated into “neighboring localized microscopic el-
ements” (E14).
Section 10 begins by observing that, contrary to
Stapp’s contention (E15), the freedom to choose is a
classical phenomenon. Subsequently the reader is taken
through the steps of Stapp’s account of mental causa-
tion, and a number of further errors (not all enumerated)
are pointed out, such as: The objective brain can (some-
times) be described as a decoherent mixture of “classi-
cally described brains” all of which must be regarded as
real (E16). Crucial to Stapp’s account is the metaphor of
the experimenter as interrogator of Nature. Within the
Copenhagen framework, which accords a special status
to measuring instruments, this is a fitting metaphor for
a well-defined scenario. In Stapp’s framework, which ac-
cords a special status to the neural correlates of mental
states, it is not (E17). Its sole purpose is to gloss over
the disparity between physical experimentation and psy-
chological attention. Once this purpose is achieved, the
metaphor is discarded, for in the end Nature not only
provides the answers but also asks the questions. The
theory Stapp ends up formulating is completely different
from the theory he initially professes to formulate (E18),
for in the beginning consciousness is responsible for state
vector reductions, while in the end a new physical law is
responsible, a law that in no wise depends on the presence
of consciousness.
The final section contains concluding remarks.
2 QUANTUM MECHANICS AND
CONSCIOUSNESS
Stapp capitalizes on von Neumann’s formulation and in-
terpretation of QM as a theory of the objective world in-
teracting with human consciousness [2]. The unobserved
world evolves according to a dynamical equation such
as the Schro¨dinger equation, while observations cause “a
sudden change that brings the objective physical state
of a system in line with a subjectively felt psychical re-
ality” [14]. This makes QM “intrinsically a theory of
mind–matter interaction,” and more specifically a theory
“about the mind–brain connection” [14]. Each of those
sudden changes
injects one “bit” of information into the quan-
tum universe. These bits are stored in the evolv-
ing objective quantum state of the universe,
which is a compendium of these bits of infor-
mation. . . . Thus the quantum state has an on-
tological character that is in part matter like,
since it is expressed in terms of the variables of
atomic physics, and it evolves between events
under the control of the laws of atomic physics.
However, each event injects the information as-
sociated with a subjective perception by some
observing system into the objective state of the
universe [14].
Whatever else a quantum state may represent, there can
be no doubt that it is first of all an algorithm for assigning
probabilities to the possible results of possible measure-
ments. This is evident from the minimal instrumentalist
interpretation of QM, the common denominator of all
possible interpretations [18]. It is also evident from J.M.
Jauch’s definition of the “state” of a quantum-mechanical
system as a probability measure resulting from a prepa-
ration of the system and his proof [19]—based on Glea-
son’s theorem [20]—that every such probability measure
has the well-known density-operator form, which reduces
to the familiar Born probability measure if the density
operator is idempotent. But if a quantum state is a
probability algorithm, then it cannot also represent an
actual state of affairs. How could it? A state of affairs
is an entirely different kettle of fish; it falls under an en-
tirely different category. This immediately disposes of the
“measurement problem” in its crudest form, which arises
only if state vectors or density operators are regarded as
representing actual states of affairs.
The quantum revolution was guided by the vision of
Niels Bohr. In 1913, Bohr rejected classical physics
wholesale, initiated the creation of an entirely new
physics, and rallied physicists to complete it. The same
genius later impressed upon physicists the true import
of the new physics: QM spells the end of mathematical
realism. The symbols and formulae of the new physics
can no longer be interpreted as mirroring (representing,
describing) the physical world. All that QM places at our
disposal is probability measures; it assigns probabilities
to the possible outcomes of possible measurements. Any
attempt to go beyond the statistical regularities encapsu-
lated by the laws of QM must, at the very least, be con-
sistent with the incontestable probabilistic significance
of quantum states. Interpretations that grant quantum
states the ontological significance of a state of affairs do
not satisfy this fundamental requirement.
According to John Bell [21], “measurement” is a bad
word. The really bad word, however, is “state,” owing to
the obvious suggestion that a quantum state represents a
state in the usual sense of the word. “Measurement” isn’t
a good word either, but this is more easily repaired. QM
represents the contingent properties of a physical system
S—the properties that S can but does not necessarily
possess—as subspaces of some vector space. Bohr rightly
insisted that a contingent property q can be attributed
to S only if the following criterion is satisfied: The pos-
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session of q by S must be indicated. The properties of
quantum systems are extrinsic in the specific sense that
they cannot be attributed unless they are indicated [22].
No property is a possessed property unless it is an in-
dicated property. Since the properties of quantum sys-
tems are usually indicated by what we call “measuring
devices,” this creates the absurd impression that labo-
ratory instruments play a fundamental ontological role.
What actually plays a fundamental role in the formula-
tion of QM is facts—actual states of affairs—and espe-
cially such facts as indicate the possessed properties of
quantum-mechanical systems. The word that ought to
replace “measurement” in any ontological interpretation
of QM is “(property-indicating) fact.”
What is a fact? The Concise Oxford Dictionary (8th
edition, 1990) defines “fact” as a thing that is known
to have occurred, to exist, or to be true; a datum of
experience; an item of verified information; a piece of
evidence. Other dictionaries give variations on the same
theme. Should we conclude from this that the editors of
dictionaries are idealists wanting to convince us that the
existence of facts presupposes knowledge or experience?
Obviously not. The correct conclusion is that “fact,” like
“existence,” like “reality,” is so fundamental a concept
that it simply cannot be defined. So what is the editor
of a dictionary to do? The obvious thing is to fall back
on the metalanguage of epistemology. Which is precisely
what Bohr did to bring home to lesser spirits the extrinsic
nature of the properties of quantum systems.
If “fact” is so fundamental a term that it cannot be de-
fined, the existence of facts—the factuality of events or
states of affairs—cannot be accounted for, any more than
we can explain why there is anything at all, rather than
nothing. (If something can be accounted for, it can be
defined in terms of whatever accounts for it.) Before the
mystery of existence—the existence of facts—we are left
with nothing but sheer dumbfoundment. Any attempt to
explain the emergence of facts (“the emergence of clas-
sicality,” as it is sometimes called) must therefore be a
wholly gratuitous endeavor.
Classical physics deals with nomologically possible
worlds—worlds consistent with physical theory. It does
not uniquely determine the actual world. Identifying the
actual world among all nomologically possible worlds is
strictly a matter of observation. Does this imply that
classical physics presupposes conscious observers? Obvi-
ously not. In classical physics the actual course of events
is in principle fully determined by the actual initial con-
ditions (or the actual initial and final conditions). In
quantum physics it also depends on unpredictable actual
states of affairs at later (or intermediate) times. Accord-
ingly, picking out the actual world from all nomologi-
cally possible worlds requires observation not only of the
actual initial conditions (or the actual initial and final
conditions) but also of those unpredictable actual states
of affairs. Does this imply that quantum physics pre-
supposes conscious observers? If the answer is negative
for classical physics, it is equally negative for quantum
physics.
QM concerns statistical correlations between
(observer-independent) facts, and these correlations
warrant interpreting the facts as indicative of properties.
That is, they warrant the existence of a physical system
to which the indicated properties can be attributed. Sup-
pose that we perform a series of position measurements,
and that every position measurement yields exactly one
result (that is, each time exactly one detector clicks).
Then we are entitled to infer the existence of a persistent
entity, to think of the clicks given off by the detectors
as matters of fact about the successive positions of
this entity, to think of the behavior of the detectors as
position measurements, and to think of the detectors
as detectors. If instead each time exactly two detectors
click, we are entitled to infer the existence of two entities
or, rather, of a physical system with the property of
having two components. This property is as extrinsic
as are the measured positions. There is a determinate
number of entities only because every time the same
number of detectors click. Not only the properties of
things but also the number of existing things supervenes
on the facts.
The ontological dependence of the properties and the
number of existing things on facts warrants a distinction
between two domains, a classical domain of facts and
a quantum domain of properties that supervene on the
facts. Owing to the ontological dependence of the do-
main of indicated properties on the domain of property-
indicating facts, the quantum domain cannot account for
the existence of the classical domain. If one nevertheless
assumes that (i) the ultimate physical reality is the quan-
tum domain, and that (ii) the existence of the domain of
facts can, and therefore should, be accounted for, then
consciousness becomes an obvious candidate: Facts exist
because they are perceived.
If in addition one wrongly assumes with von Neumann
that the quantum state represents the dynamical evolu-
tion of the quantum domain, one is faced with the spu-
rious problem of reconciling two disparate modes of evo-
lution. The obvious “solution” then is to consider one
mode of evolution intrinsic to the quantum domain and
to blame the other mode on the intervention of conscious
observers. This, in brief, is how some of the brightest
physicists were led to conclude that QM is an epistemic
theory, concerned with our knowledge or experience of
the factual situation rather than the factual situation it-
self. One is reminded of the various God-of-the-gaps pro-
posals of the past. While invoking divine intervention as
a filler for explanatory gaps is no longer in fashion, there
is a tendency to invoke consciousness instead.
For reasons that are obvious rather than mysterious,
probability measures have two modes of “change.” Prob-
abilities are assigned on the basis of relevant facts, and
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they are assigned to sets of possible property-indicating
facts, or else to the properties indicated by such facts.
They depend (i) on the time t of the possible facts to
which they are assigned and (ii) on the facts on which
the assignment is based. They therefore “change” not
only in a “deterministic” manner, as functions of t, but
also unpredictably with every fresh relevant fact. The
successful completion of a measurement is the relevant
fact par excellence. If the outcome is unpredictable, as
it generally is, it has to be included among the relevant
facts on which further probability assignments ought to
be based. The outcome being unpredictable, the basis
of relevant facts changes unpredictably as a matter of
course, and so do the probabilities assigned on this basis.
The reason for the quotation marks is that a proba-
bility is not the kind of thing that changes. To see this,
consider the Born probability p (R, t) of finding a particle
in a region R at a time t. While few would think of this
probability as something that exists inside R, many ap-
pear to think of it as something that exists at the time t.
The prevalent idea is that the possibility of finding the
particle inside R exists at all times for which p (R, t) > 0,
so the probability associated with this possibility also ex-
ists at all those times and changes as a function of time.
Yet the possibility that a property-indicating state of af-
fairs obtains at the time t is not something that exists
at the time t, anymore than the possibility of finding the
particle in R is something that one can find inside R.
And the same obviously holds true of the probability as-
sociated with this possibility. p (R, t) isn’t something of
which we can say when it exists. A fortiori it isn’t some-
thing that can change or evolve. All quantum-mechanical
probability assignments are conditional on the existence
of a matter of fact about the value of a given observable
at a given time. p (R, t) is not associated with the pos-
sibility that all of a sudden, at the time t, the particle
“materializes” inside R. It is the probability with which
the particle is found in R, given that at the time t it is
found in one of a set of mutually disjoint regions (no mat-
ter which one, R being one of them). The parameter t
on which this probability depends is the specified time of
this actually or counterfactually performed position mea-
surement. It refers to the time of a position-indicating
state of affairs, the existence of which is assumed.
So much for the “change” of p (R, t) associated with
the argument t. It is obvious that the sense in which
p (R, t)—for a fixed value of t—“changes” when assigned
on the basis of a fresh set of facts, is also not the sense
in which a state of affairs evolves as time passes.
By misconstruing quantum states as evolving states
of affairs with two modes of change, von Neumann [2]
created a number of pseudo-problems and spawned an
entire industry dedicated to generating gratuitous solu-
tions. Are wave function collapses in the mind but not
in the world? Or are they in the mind because they are
in the world? Or are they in the mind and therefore in
the world? The first option leads to the many-worlds (or
many-minds [8]) extravaganza, the second to nonlinear
adulterations of QM [23, 24, 25], the third to epistemic in-
terpretations. If the premise is that system S enters into
a “state of entanglement” with apparatus A then appara-
tus A enters into a “state of entanglement” with Cecily’s
brain as she takes cognizance of the measurement out-
come. The definiteness of observation reports combined
with the principle of psycho-physical parallelism [2]—
subjective perceptions correspond to objective goings-on
in the brain—then spells collapse. Hence Cecily’s percep-
tions exert a causal influence on the “objective physical
state” [14] of S via the objective goings-on in her brain
and their entanglement with S.
The bottom line: The introduction of consciousness
into interpretations of QM affords nothing but gratuitous
solutions to pseudo-problems. These pseudo-problems
arise whenever quantum states are construed, inconsis-
tently with the statistical significance of quantum states,
as evolving states of affairs. There does exist an extra-
theoretical element that cannot be accounted for by ei-
ther classical or quantum physics, but this neither is con-
sciousness nor can be accounted for in epistemic terms. It
is the actuality of exactly one of all nomologically possi-
ble worlds, or the factuality of property-indicating facts.
This (f)actuality owes nothing to the consciousness of
an “observing system” [14]; it is what distinguishes the
world from any theory about the world.
3 QUANTUM MECHANICS AND
PROPENSITIES
The following characterizations of the physical world and
of physical states are central to Stapp’s “objective in-
terpretation of von Neumann’s formulation of quantum
theory” [14]:
The observed physical world is described. . . by a
mathematical structure that can best be charac-
terized as representing information and propen-
sities : the information is about certain events
that have occurred in the past, and the propen-
sities are objective tendencies pertaining to fu-
ture events.
The objective physical state is. . . converted from
a material substrate to an informational and
dispositional substrate that carries both the in-
formation incorporated into it by the psychical
realities, and certain dispositions for the occur-
rence of future psychical realities [14].
The possibility that something happens at the time t, re-
call, is not something that exists at the time t, anymore
than the possibility of finding a particle in a region R is
something that one can find inside R. A possibility is
not the kind of thing that persists and changes in time.
4
To think of possibilities as if they possessed an actuality
of their own, different from the actuality of facts, and as
if they persisted and changed (“evolved”) in time, is an
obvious category error. This logical mistake gives rise to
the somewhat gentler avatar of the “measurement prob-
lem,” which asks: How is it that during a measurement
one of the persisting possibilities (or worse, one of the
changing probabilities associated with them1) becomes a
fact, while the others cease to exist? Saying in common
language that a possibility becomes a fact is the same as
saying that something that is possible—something that
can be a fact—actually is a fact. How can that be a prob-
lem? This non-problem becomes a pseudo-problem if one
forgets that there is only one kind of actuality and mis-
construes the common-language “existence” of a possibil-
ity as a second kind of actuality, called “propensity”[27]
or “potentiality”[28, 29], that gets converted into the gen-
uine article when a measurement is made.
If one wants to associate a measurement with the “ac-
tualization of a possibility” in a logically coherent man-
ner, one must not portray it as a transition from an earlier
state of affairs, in which the possibility “exists” as a pos-
sibility, to a later state of affairs, in which it is a fact.
The possibilities to which QM assigns probabilities can
all be formulated in the following manner:
(S) A measurement of the (system-specific) observable Q
performed at the time t yields the result qk.
(Conjunctions can be formulated as well: “Measurements
of Q1 and Q2 performed at the respective times t1 and
t2 yield the respective results q
1
i and q
2
k.”) Owing to its
explicit reference to the time of measurement, such a sen-
tence cannot become true or false. If (S) is true, it always
has been and always will be true, and if it is false, it al-
ways has been and always will be false. Saying that the
possibility expressed by (S) has been actualized is there-
fore the same as saying that (S) is true. Nothing more
must be read into this sentence. The question as to when
this actualization took place is utterly meaningless. If the
“actualization of a possibility” involves a “transition,” it
is the logical transition from a possible world in which
Q is not measured at the time t to the actual world in
which Q is successfully measured at the time t.
The bottom line: The only problem that is addressed
by the introduction of propensities or potentialities into
interpretations of QM is another pseudo-problem orig-
inating from another logical mistake. It arises if one
thinks of the possibilities to which QM refers, and of the
probabilities it assigns to them, as if they constituted a
self-existent matrix from which facts arise.
1“Above all, we would like to understand how it is that proba-
bilities become facts.”—S. Treiman [26]. Dozens of similar phrases
can be found in the literature.
4 QUANTUM MECHANICS AND
SPECIAL RELATIVITY
It is well known that the statistical regularities with
which QM is concerned are consistent with SR, while
von Neumann’s interpretation of states as evolving, col-
lapsible states of affairs is not. Stapp tries to reconcile
SR with von Neumann’s interpretation by giving “spe-
cial objective physical status” [14] to a particular family
of constant-time hypersurfaces: State reductions occur
globally and instantaneously with respect to this fam-
ily of hypersurfaces. He offers two arguments purporting
to support the existence of a “dynamically preferred se-
quence of instantaneous ‘nows’ ” [14]. The first invokes
astronomical data that, incontestably, indicate the exis-
tence of a (cosmologically) preferred sequence of “nows.”
This argument fails to distinguish sufficiently between
(i) a dynamically preferred sequence of hypersurfaces—
a sequence implied by the dynamical laws and present
in every possible world consistent with them—and (ii) a
preferred sequence of contingent and historical character
that is not implied by the dynamical laws and therefore is
not a feature of every nomologically possible world. The
astronomical data suggest the existence of a historically
preferred sequence but give no evidence of a dynamically
preferred one.
The second argument is based on an experiment of the
kind first discussed by Lucien Hardy [30]. There are two
regions L and R in spacelike separation such that, in a
certain coordinate system (x, y, z, t), R is earlier than L.
Two two-valued observables Li and Ri (i = 1, 2) can be
measured in each region. The joint probabilities of the
various possible results are determined by
|Ψ〉 = |L1+, R1−〉− |L2−, R2+〉〈L2−, R2+ |L1+, R1−〉,
(1)
and they warrant the following assertions:
L1− ⇒ R2+, (2)
R2+⇒ L2+, (3)
L2+⇒ R1−, (4)
L1− 6⇒ R1−. (5)
In longhand (2) says that if L1 is measured and the re-
sult is L1− then if R2 is measured the result is R2+.
On account of (2), the conditional “If R2 is measured
then R2+ is obtained” is valid on condition that L1 is
measured and L1− is obtained. On account of (3), the
conditional “If L2 is measured then L2+ is obtained”
is valid on condition that R2 is measured and R2+ is
obtained. Combining these two conditional statements,
Stapp arrives at the following conclusion:
(A) If L1 and R2 are measured and the outcome
of the measurement of L1 is L1− then if L2 had
been measured instead of L1 the outcome L2+
would have been obtained.
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While it is legitimate to ask for the result that would
have been obtained if L2 had been measured instead of
L1, it is illegitimate to base the answer on the assumption
that L1 was measured. There is no quantum state such
that both L1 and L2 are dispersion-free. It is therefore
logically impossible to counterfactually assign a definite
value to L2 on the basis of a result of a measurement of
L1. Probabilities can be assigned counterfactually (that
is, to the possible results of unperformed measurements),
but only if the facts on the basis of which they are as-
signed are consistent with the measurements to the possi-
ble results of which they are assigned. The combination
of the above two conditional statements is illegitimate
because it assigns a probability to a possible outcome of
a measurement of L2 on the basis of an outcome of a
measurement of L1. The existence of an outcome of the
former measurement is inconsistent with the existence of
an outcome of the latter measurement.
By an equally fallacious route Stapp arrives at the con-
clusion that the following statement is false:
(B) If L1 and R1 are measured and the outcome
of the measurement of L1 is L1− then if L2 had
been measured instead of L1 the outcome L2+
would have been obtained.
Here, too, two individually correct statements are com-
bined in a logically inconsistent manner: (i) The an-
tecedent (including the assumption that L1 is measured)
and (5) jointly imply that sometimes R1+ is obtained.
(ii) The assumption that R1+ is obtained and (4) jointly
imply that a measurement of L2 does not yield L2+.
Both statements are correct, but they consider logically
incompatible situations, so that no valid conclusions can
be drawn from their conjunction.
To buttress his conclusions, Stapp makes the as-
sumption that in the coordinate system (x, y, z, t) no
backward-in-time influences occur. He makes this as-
sumption to exclude two possibilities: (i) the possibil-
ity that the result R2+ causally depends on the result
L1− and therefore cannot be invoked to infer that L2+
would have been obtained had L2 been measured instead
of L1, and (ii) the possibility that the occasional result
R1+ causally depends on the result L1− and therefore
cannot be invoked to infer that, whenever R1+ is ob-
tained, L2+ would not have been obtained had L2 been
measured instead of L1. Causal considerations, however,
are completely irrelevant to the validity or otherwise of
Stapp’s conclusions. What invalidates his conclusions is
the fact that statements concerning the value of one ob-
servable cannot be based on assumptions concerning the
value of another observable if the two observables are in-
compatible.
From the truth of (A) (symbolically: L1− ∧ R2± ⇒
L2+) and the falsity of (B) (symbolically: L1−∧R1± 6⇒
L2+) Stapp infers that
a theoretical constraint upon what nature can
choose in region L, under conditions freely cho-
sen by the experimenter in region L, depends
nontrivially on which experiment is freely cho-
sen by the experimenter in region R. . . . But
this dependence cannot be upheld without the
information about the free choice made in region
R getting to region L: some sort of faster-than-
light transfer of information is required.
The occurrence of L1 on the left-hand side of the above
symbolic formulae representing the truth of (A) and the
falsity of (B), respectively, is logically inconsistent with
the occurrence of L2 on the right-hand side. Therefore
Stapp’s second argument also fails to establish the “spe-
cial objective physical status” [14] of a particular family
of constant-time hypersurfaces, or the existence of a “dy-
namically preferred sequence of instantaneous ‘nows’.”
Stapp considers the nonexistence of a such a dynam-
ically preferred sequence in SR an empirically unwar-
ranted “metaphysical idea.” What would the existence
of such a sequence amount to?
The great theoretical breakthrough that gave us SR
came with the realization that (i) what propagates with
an invariant speed requires no medium, and that (ii) the
invariant speed is the finite speed of light c. “Invariant”
means “independent of the inertial frame in which it is
measured.” It is not hard to see that there cannot be
more than one invariant speed.
If an event e1 at (x1, t1) is the cause of an event e2 at
(x2, t2), the fact that e2 happens at t2, rather than at any
other time, has two possible explanations. If the causal
connection is mediated, and if x1, t1, and x2 are fixed, t2
is determined by the speed of mediation. This could be
the speed of a material particle traveling from x1 to x2
or the speed of signal propagation in an elastic medium.
On the other hand, if the causal connection is unmediated,
t2 is determined by the metric structure with respect to
which the dynamical laws are formulated, and this metric
structure defines an invariant speed. In a nonrelativistic
world the metric structure defines an infinite invariant
speed—what propagates instantaneously, or with an in-
finite speed, in one inertial frame, does so in every other
inertial frame,—whereas in a relativistic world it defines
a finite invariant speed. In a nonrelativistic world, ac-
cordingly, the dynamical laws allow for an unmediated
causal connection between e1 and e2 provided that, in-
variantly, t2 = t1, while in a relativistic world they allow
for an unmediated causal connection between e1 and e2
provided that, invariantly, (x2 − x1)/(t2 − t1) = c.
We live in a world in which the dynamical laws con-
strain unmediated signal propagation to null geodesics.2
2For reasons that are psychological rather than physical, most
physicists believe that photons are particles that mediate influences,
rather than elementary unmediated influences. (I am not saying
that they are either.)
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Signal propagation occurring along either timelike or
spacelike geodesics cannot be invariant and therefore
cannot be unmediated. By claiming the existence of a
dynamically preferred family of constant-time hypersur-
faces, Stapp therefore effectively postulates the existence
of a quantum counterpart to the luminiferous ether. He
may be inclined to deny this, but as long as the speed
of light is invariant, there can be no other explanation
why state reduction occurs with respect to one family
of hypersurfaces rather than another (assuming that it
does occur). The only way for Stapp to avoid the im-
plication of a “quantum ether” is to revert to the metric
of Galilean relativity, which implies the existence of pre-
ferred family of constant-time hypersurfaces, at the ex-
pense of reintroducing the luminiferous ether. So which
is the unwarranted “metaphysical idea”? The existence
of a preferred family of hypersurfaces, which, combined
with the invariance of the speed of light, implies the exis-
tence of one ether or another, or the nonexistence of such
a preferred family?
5 QUANTUM MECHANICS AND
THE EXPERIENTIAL NOW
We are accustomed to the idea that the redness of a ripe
tomato exists in our minds, rather than in the physical
world. We find it incomparably more difficult to accept
that the same is true of the experiential now: It has no
counterpart in the physical world. There simply is no
objective way to characterize the present. And since the
past and the future are defined relative to the present,
they too cannot be defined in objective terms. The tem-
poral modes past, present, and future can be character-
ized only by how they relate to us as conscious subjects:
through memory, through the present-tense immediacy of
qualia (introspectible properties like pink or turquoise),
or through anticipation. In the world that is accessible
to physics we may qualify events or states of affairs as
past, present, or future relative to other events or states
of affairs, but we cannot speak of the past, the present,
or the future.
The proper view of physical reality therefore is not only
what Nagel [31] has called “the view from nowhere” (the
objective world does not contain a preferred position cor-
responding to the spatial location whence I survey it); it
is also what Price has called “the view from nowhen” [32]:
The objective world does not contain a preferred time
corresponding to the particular moment (the present) at
which I experience it. The objective world contains spa-
tial and temporal relations as well as the corresponding
relata, but it does not contain any kind of basis for the
distinction between a past, a present, and a future. The
idea that some things exist not yet and others exist no
longer is as true and as false as the idea that a ripe tomato
is red.
If we conceive of temporal relations, we conceive of the
corresponding relata simultaneously—they exist at the
same time in our minds—even though they happen or
obtain at different times in the objective world. Since
we can’t help it, that has to be OK. But it is definitely
not OK if we sneak into our simultaneous spatial men-
tal picture of a spatiotemporal whole anything that ad-
vances across this spatiotemporal whole. We cannot men-
tally represent a spatiotemporal whole as a simultaneous
spatial whole and then imagine this simultaneous spatial
whole as persisting in time and the present as advancing
through it. There is only one time, the fourth dimension
of the spatiotemporal whole. There is not another time
in which this spatiotemporal whole persists as a spatial
whole and in which the present advances, or in which an
objective instantaneous state evolves. If the present is
anywhere in the spatiotemporal whole, it is trivially and
vacuously everywhere—or, rather, everywhen.
In a world that has no room for an advancing now,
time does not “flow” or “pass.” Objective time is a set
of temporal relations between temporal relata that owe
their successive character to our minds, rather than to
anything in the objective world. To philosophers the per-
plexities and absurdities entailed by the notion of an ob-
jective advancing present or an objectively flowing time
are well known [33]. Physicists began to recognize the
subjectivity of the present and the nonexistence of an
evolving instantaneous state with the discovery of the
relativity of simultaneity. In the well-known words of
Hermann Weyl [34],
The objective world simply is ; it does not hap-
pen. Only to the gaze of my consciousness,
crawling upward along the life line of my body,
does a section of this world come to life as
a fleeting image in space which continuously
changes in time.
Not only the fleeting and continuously changing image
but also the “crawling upward” of our consciousness is a
subjective phenomenon. So is change, and so is becom-
ing.
The myth of an evolving instantaneous physical state
is supported by a folk tale of considerable appeal. It goes
like this: Since the past is no longer real, it can influ-
ence the present only through the mediation of something
that persists through time. Causal influences reach from
the nonexistent past into the nonexistent future by be-
ing “carried through time” by something that “stays in
the present.” There is, accordingly, an evolving instan-
taneous state, and this includes not only all presently
possessed properties but also everything in the past that
is causally relevant to the future. This is how we come
to conceive of “fields of force” that evolve in time (and
therefore, in a relativistic world, according to the princi-
ple of local action), and that “mediate” between the past
and the future (and therefore, in a relativistic world, be-
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tween local causes and their distant effects). It is also how
we come to believe that the state vector plays a similar
causally mediating role. It is high time that we outgrow
these incoherent beliefs.
There was a time when characterizing something as
subjective was tantamount to denigrating it as an “illu-
sion.” This is not my intention. Change and becoming
are no less real and no less significant for being subjec-
tive. My point is that a theory of mind–matter interac-
tion, which is what Stapp’s theory purports to be, must
proceed from a clear understanding of which features of
the experienced, phenomenal world do, and which do
not, have a counterpart in the physical world. Instead
of proceeding from such an understanding, Stapp’s the-
ory features the chimera of “an evolving objective phys-
ical world.” It is “a theory of the interaction between
the evolving objective state of the physical universe and
a sequence of mental events, each of which is associated
with a localized individual system.”
It might be argued that without an objective becom-
ing there can be no freedom of choice. Such freedom
seems to require an open future. In fact, the apparent
incompatibility of free volition with the “block universe”
of SR is one of the reasons why Stapp rejects the idea
that “all of history can be conceived to be laid out in a
four-dimensional spacetime.” According to him, free will
“leads to a picture of a reality that gradually unfolds in
response to choices that are not necessarily fixed by the
prior physical part of reality alone.”
This too is an error. All that the freedom to choose
requires is the impossibility of knowing, at any one time,
what is the case at a later time. Obviously, if I can know
at the time t a state of affairs that obtains at the time
t′ > t, I cannot conceive of it as causally dependent on a
free choice made by me in the interval between t and t′.
If at any time t I can know the future (relative to t), I
cannot conceive of myself as a free agent. On the other
hand, if the possibility of foreknowledge does not exist, I
cannot merely conceive of myself as a free agent. I can
actually be a free agent, for the only thing that logically
prevents me from being responsible for a later state of
affairs is the possibility of knowing the same before the
relevant choices are made. The fact that the future in a
sense “already” exists is no reason why choices made by
me at earlier times cannot be partly responsible for it.
(The future relative to a time t exists “already” not in
the sense that it exists simultaneously with what exists
at the time t, which would be self-contradictory, but in
the sense that it exists objectively in exactly the same
tenseless or atemporal sense in which what exists at the
time t exists.)
Since nothing in the physical world corresponds to the
distinction between what exists now and what does not
yet exist, the future (relative to a time t) is as closed as
the past. If a measurement of the value possessed by Q
at the time t is successfully performed at the time t′ ≥ t,
and the result is q, then it always has been and always
will be true that the value of Q at the time t is q. There
is nothing physically open about this. From the point of
view of physics, the outcomes of performed measurements
are always “fixed and settled” [14]. Nothing objectively
changes at the time t (unless t = t′). What objectively
changes, at the time t′, is that subsequently there ob-
tains an actual state of affairs from which the value of Q
at the time t can be inferred. The causal interconnected-
ness of the classical domain ensures that the possibility
(in principle) of inferring the value of Q at the time t will
persist. (See Sec. 8 below. In measurement theory this is
usually referred to as the creation of a record [35].) The
misconception that the value of Q at the time t did not
exist until it was observed or became inferable has to be
seen for what it is: a naive objectification or reification
of our ignorance, which ceases to exist, in principle at the
time t′, and in actual fact when we look at the pointer.
What is (and always has been, and always will be) objec-
tively open is the results of unperformed measurements.
6 QUANTUM MECHANICS AND
CAUSALITY
Physics concerns spatiotemporal regularities. Classical
physics concerns deterministic regularities that permit
us to make (i) definite predictions on the basis of ini-
tial positions in phase space, (ii) definite retrodictions on
the basis of final positions in phase space, and (iii) defi-
nite inferences of intermediate states on the basis of ini-
tial and final positions in configuration space. Quan-
tum physics concerns statistical regularities that permit
us to assign (i) prior probabilities on the basis of ear-
lier property-indicating facts according to the Born rule,
(ii) posterior probabilities on the basis of later property-
indicating facts according to the same rule, and (iii) time-
symmetric probabilities on the basis of earlier and later
property-indicating facts according to the ABL rule [36],
so named after Aharonov, Bergmann, and Lebowitz [37].
The deterministic regularities of classical physics lend
themselves to a causal interpretation, according to which
the observable regularities are due to unobservable causal
strings by means of which earlier events necessitate
later events. Since the time-symmetric laws of classical
physics provide no objective foundation for it, this time-
asymmetric interpretation can be nothing but an anthro-
pomorphic projection, into the time-symmetric world of
classical physics, of the successive perspective of a con-
scious agent. Causality lies in the eye of the beholder [17].
It is our way of interpreting events, not a feature of the
events in themselves. At best it is a secondary quality
like pink or turquoise [38].
The statistical regularities of quantum physics do not
admit of this anthropomorphic projection. To begin with,
measurement outcomes are causal primaries. They are
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value-indicating states of affairs that are not necessitated
by antecedent causes. To see this, recall from Sec. 2 that
all quantum-mechanical probability assignments involve
the assumption that the value of a specific observable at
a specific time is indicated by an actual state of affairs.
Quantum mechanics never predicts that a measurement
will take place, nor when one will take place. And if
QM is the fundamental and complete theoretical frame-
work that most of us believe it is, these things cannot be
predicted because there is nothing that necessitates the
existence of a value-indicating state of affairs.
I do not mean to say that in general nothing causes
a measurement to yield this particular outcome rather
than that. Unless hidden variables are postulated, this
is a triviality. What I am saying is that nothing ever
causes a measurement to take place. A clear distinction
between two kinds of probability must be maintained. In
the context of a position measurement using an array of
detectors, this is the distinction between the probabil-
ity that a detector will respond (no matter which) and
the probability that a specific detector will respond given
that any one detector will respond. The latter probabil-
ity is the one that quantum mechanics is concerned with.
The former probability can be measured (for instance,
by using similar detectors in series), but it cannot be
calculated from first principles, for essentially the same
reason that a fundamental coupling constant cannot be
so calculated [22].
If anything is causally determined, it can only be
the probabilities associated with measurement outcomes.
But the dependence of quantum-mechanical probability
assignments on facts also does not admit of a causal in-
terpretation, for at least two reasons. For one, there isn’t
just one way of assigning probabilities. If probability as-
signments are to be of any use, they have to be based on
facts. But the probability p (Q=q, t) of the result q of a
measurement of Q at the time t can be assigned on the
basis of several different (sets of) facts. After all, proba-
bilities are nothing but best guesses given the facts that
are taken into account. This is true even if Nature herself
tells us (via the laws of QM) what probabilities we should
assign, for Nature does not tell us which facts should be
taken into account. This choice is left to us. Stapp’s be-
lief that this choice too is dictated by Nature—that the
probability p (Q=q, t) is uniquely determined by a unique
past (relative to t)—is an error.
Another reason why quantum-mechanical probabilities
cannot be causally explained is that a best guess is not the
kind of thing that admits of a causal explanation. While
a best guess obviously depends on a chosen set of facts,
it cannot be construed as an objective propensity that
is causally determined by a unique set of facts, without
committing some of the fallacies pointed out above.
The ontological dependence of all possessed properties
on property-indicating states of affairs, combined with
the fact that such states of affairs are causal primaries,
implies that at a fundamental level nothing in the physical
world is necessitated by antecedent causes. The acausal
foundation of the physical world ought to be regarded
as one of the most important discoveries of modern sci-
ence, rather than deplored as the “Copenhagen renun-
ciation” of all “attempts to understand physical real-
ity” [14]. As the following sections will show, the impossi-
bility of causally construing the quantum-mechanical cor-
relations has significant ontological implications. It does
not entail that we must “renounce for all time the aim of
trying to understand the world in which we live” [14].
7 OBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES
N. David Mermin believes that all the mysteries of quan-
tum mechanics can be reduced to the single puzzle posed
by the existence of objective probabilities [39]. I concur.
The objective probabilities Mermin has in mind, however,
are not the objectified evolving probabilities Stapp calls
“propensities.” Probabilities qualify as objective if and
only if they are assigned on the basis of all relevant facts,
so that there is nothing to be ignorant of. The probabil-
ities of classical statistical physics are always subjective;
they make up for facts that we ignore. The prior Born
probabilities that we assign to the possible results of per-
formed measurements are equally subjective, inasmuch
as we assign them without taking the actual results into
account.
The term “objective probability” has two natural def-
initions. When there are actual states of affairs having a
bearing on the probability p (Q=q, t), this probability is
objective only if all of them are taken into account, re-
gardless of whether they obtain before or after the time t.
In this case p (Q=q, t) is given by the ABL rule [22, 36].
The second definition is appropriate when there aren’t
any relevant facts. This is the case when we are dealing
with the stationary probability measures that solve the
time-independent Schro¨dinger equation, rather than with
probability measures that depend on initial and/or final
conditions imposed on the time-dependent Schro¨dinger
equation. The Born probabilities we obtain from sta-
tionary states are objective just in case they are counter-
factually assigned.
What is the ontological significance of objective Born
probabilities? The pertinent issue is the stability of mat-
ter. When Bohr wrote his doctoral thesis on the electron
theory of metals, he became fascinated by its instabil-
ities. They suggested to him a new type of stabilizing
force, one fundamentally different from those familiar in
classical physics. Transferring his postdoctoral attention
from metals to Rutherford’s atom, Bohr realized that this
too ought to be unstable, and by imposing his well-known
quantum conditions he took the first step toward an un-
derstanding of the force that stabilizes matter. When the
mature theory arrived twelve years later, it transpired
that this “force” hinges on the fuzziness of internal spa-
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tial relations. What “fluffs out” matter is the indefinite-
ness of the relative positions of its constituents. Though
today this fact is known to every physicist, few seem to
attach to it the importance that it deserves.
The proper way of dealing with fuzzy values is to make
counterfactual probability assignments. If a quantity is
said to have an “indefinite value,” what is really intended
is that it does not actually have a value (inasmuch as the
value is not measured) but that it would have a value if
this were indicated, and that at least two possible values
are associated with positive probabilities. (The counter-
factuality cannot be eliminated, though it may be shifted
from measurements to fuzzy values: If measurements of
an observable Q are successfully performed on an ensem-
ble of identically prepared systems, and if the results have
positive dispersion, the value of Q would be fuzzy with re-
gard to an individual system S if the measurement were
not performed on S.)
The objective probabilities associated with the results
of unperformed measurements thus are the formal ex-
pression of an objective indefiniteness. The extrinsic na-
ture of the values of quantum-mechanical observables fol-
lows directly from this indefiniteness. It is a straightfor-
ward consequence of an objective fuzziness in the world
in which we live. Here is how: The proper expression
of this fuzziness, as we just saw, involves counterfactual
probability assignments. These assignments are based on
the observable statistical correlations that QM encapsu-
lates. We are therefore dealing with conditional prob-
ability assignments whose antecedents may or may not
be true. We therefore need a criterion for when an an-
tecedent is true, and this consists in the existence of a
value-indicating fact.
The extrinsic nature of possessed values is not con-
fined to atoms and suchlike. As Peres and Zurek [40]
rightly insist, “[t]here is nothing in quantum theory mak-
ing it applicable to three atoms and inapplicable to 1023.”
Although the moon isn’t only there when somebody
looks [41], it is there only because of the myriad of facts
that betoken its presence. If there weren’t any actual
state of affairs from which its position could be inferred,
it wouldn’t have a position, or else its position wouldn’t
have a value. (There is no need for anyone to actually
carry out the inference.) This seems to entail a vicious
regress, which at first blush looks like just another version
of von Neumann’s catastrophe of infinite regression.
The positions of detectors are extrinsic too. They are
what they are only because of the facts that indicate what
they are. This seems to require the existence of detec-
tor detectors indicating the positions of detectors, which
seems to require the existence of detectors indicating the
positions of detector detectors, and so on ad infinitum.
Generally speaking, the contingent properties of things
“dangle” ontologically from what is the case in the rest
of the world. Yet what is the case there can only be
described by describing material objects, and the prop-
erties of such objects too “dangle” from the goings-on in
the rest of the world. This seems to send us chasing the
ultimate property-indicating facts in never-ending circles.
So were does the buck stop? As it stands, the question
is ill posed. There are no valueless positions in search of
value-indicating facts. There are facts, and there are sta-
tistical correlations among value-indicating facts. These
correlations warrant inferences to the existence of objects
with properties that have indefinite values (in the sense
explained above), and they also warrant the interpreta-
tion of the statistically correlated facts as indicating pos-
sessed values. The genuine core of the “measurement
problem” is this: Value-indicating facts are actual states
of affairs. Facts are by definition factual per se. Yet a
state of affairs involves objects and their properties, and
the properties of objects are extrinsic; their possession
is not factual per se. So what justifies our treating the
value-indicating properties of value-indicating things as
if they were intrinsic (the opposite of extrinsic)? The
answer will be given in the following section.
8 THE CLASSICAL DOMAIN
The positional indefiniteness of a material object O
evinces itself through the unpredictability of the results
of position measurements performed on O. Evidence of
the corresponding statistical dispersion requires the ex-
istence of detectors with sensitive regions that are small
and localized enough to probe the range of values over
which O’s position is distributed. (A detector is any ob-
ject capable of indicating the presence of another object
in a particular region.) If there are no such detectors, the
indefiniteness of O’s position cannot evince itself. But
detectors with sharper positions and sufficiently small
sensitive regions cannot exist for all detectable objects.
Since no relative position is absolutely sharp, there is a
finite limit to the sharpness of the positions of material
objects, and there is a finite limit to the spatial reso-
lution of actually existing detectors. Hence there are
objects whose positions are the sharpest in existence.
These never evince their indefiniteness through unpre-
dictable position-indicating facts. Such objects deserve
to be designated “macroscopic.” We cannot be certain
that a given object qualifies as macroscopic, inasmuch as
not all matters of fact about its whereabouts are accessi-
ble to us, but we can be certain that macroscopic objects
exist.
If the positional indefiniteness of a macroscopic ob-
ject never evinces itself through unpredictable position-
indicating events—the occasional unpredictability of the
position of a macroscopic pointer reveals the indefinite-
ness of a property of a different object, not the indefinite-
ness of the position of the pointer—then it is legitimate
to ignore the positional indefiniteness of macroscopic ob-
jects. We can associate such objects with classical tra-
jectories, provided we understand the claims involved. It
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is not claimed that macroscopic objects have exact posi-
tions. It is only claimed that since their positions are the
most definite in existence, the indefiniteness of their posi-
tions never shows up in the realm of facts. If we make the
assumption that macroscopic objects follow definite tra-
jectories, we will never see this assumption contradicted
by facts. But if it is legitimate to ignore the positional
indefiniteness of macroscopic objects, it is also legitimate
to treat the positions of macroscopic objects as intrinsic.
The step from acknowledging the extrinsic nature of all
contingent properties to treating the positions of macro-
scopic objects as intrinsic is of the same nature as the
step from acknowledging the purely correlative character
of classical laws of motion to the use of causal language.
Macroscopic objects evolve predictably in the sense that
every time the position of such an object is indicated, its
value is consistent with all predictions made on the basis
of (i) all past indicated properties and (ii) the classical
laws of motion. (As mentioned above, there is one ex-
ception: Whenever the position of such an object serves
to indicate an unpredictable property in the quantum
domain, it is itself not predictable.) This makes it pos-
sible to think of the positions of macroscopic objects as
forming a self-contained system of positions that “dan-
gle” causally from each other, and this makes it possible
to disregard that in reality they “dangle” ontologically
from position-indicating facts. Predictability warrants
the applicability of causal concepts, and the applicabil-
ity of causal concepts to macroscopic objects warrants
treating their positions as intrinsic.
Causality and intrinsic properties therefore stand and
fall together. Where the extrinsic nature of properties
cannot be ignored, causal concepts cannot be applied.
While correlations that are not manifestly probabilistic
(like those between the successive positions of macro-
scopic objects) can be embellished with causal stories,
in the quantum domain causal concepts are out of place.
We can impose them on the classical domain with some
measure of consistency, although this entails the use of
a wrong criterion: Temporal precedence takes the place
of causal independence as the criterion that distinguishes
causes from effects. But when we deal with correlations
that are manifestly probabilistic, projecting our agent
causality into the physical world does not work. Try-
ing to causally explain these correlations is putting the
cart in front of the horse. It is the statistical correlations
that explain why causal explanations work to the extent
they do. They work in the classical domain where sta-
tistical variations are not in evidence. If we go beyond
this domain, we realize that all correlations are essen-
tially statistical, even where statistical variations are not
in evidence, and that causality is a function of psychology
rather than a physical concept.
9 THE SPATIOTEMPORAL
DIFFERENTIATION OF REALITY
According to Richard Feynman, the mother of all quan-
tum effects is the strange behavior of electrons in two-
slit experiments [42]. If nothing indicates the slit taken
by an electron then this electron goes through both slits
without going through a particular slit and without hav-
ing parts that go through different slits. The bafflement
caused by this behavior is symptomatic of a mismatch
between the spatial aspect of the physical world and the
way in which we all tend to think about space, for psy-
chological and neurophysiological reasons [43, 44].
We tend to think of space as a set of points cardinally
equal to the set IR3 of triplets of real numbers, or else
we tend to think of space as an extended thing that it is
inherently divided into mutually disjoint regions (philo-
sophically speaking, an extended substance with intrinsic
parts), and we consider it legitimate to mathematically
represent this thing by the set IR3. (If it’s intrinsically
divided, then it’s divided into infinitesimal regions, and
then it seems OK to represent these regions by the ele-
ments of IR3.)
QM is trying to tell us otherwise. The only positions
in existence are (i) the (not manifestly fuzzy) positions of
macroscopic objects and (ii) the positions possessed by
objects in the quantum domain. The latter are defined by
the sensitive regions of macroscopic detectors, are always
finite in extent, and are possessed only when indicated.
The proper way of thinking, speaking, or writing about
a “region of space,” therefore, is to never let the logical
or grammatical subject of a sentence refer to it. Regions
of space are not things that exist by themselves, nor are
they parts of a thing that exists by itself. Since they exist
only as properties of material things, only predicates of
sentences about material things should refer to them.
If they were things, the regions defined by the two
slits—let’s call them L and R—would be distinct, self-
existent parts of space. An object that is in the union
U = L ∪ R of two distinct, self-existent parts of space,
either is in L, or is in R, or is divided by the distinct-
ness of L and R into two parts, one in L and one in R.
Since electrons in two-slit experiments can go through U
without going through either L or R and without being
divided into parts that go through different slits, the two
slits cannot be things. L and R are properties that are
possessed if and only if their possession is indicated. If
they are not possessed (because they are not indicated)
then they do not exist. But if they do not exist, they
obviously cannot compel electrons to “choose” between
them.
A position measurement performed on O at a time t
withN detectorsDi (sensitive regionsRi) answersN yes-
no questions. It yields truth values (“true” or “false”)
for N propositions of the form pi =“O is inside Ri at the
time t.” Where O is concerned, the world at the time
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t is spatially differentiated into N finite regions. They
exist for O because the propositions pi are either true
or false, and these propositions are either true or false
because their truth values are indicated. (If their truth
values are not indicated, they are neither true nor false
but meaningless.)
That we can treat the positions of macroscopic ob-
jects as intrinsic, for reasons and subject to qualifica-
tions stated in the previous section, does not change the
fact that at bottom they too are extrinsic. While the
whereabouts of macroscopic objects are abundantly and
redundantly indicated, they are never indicated with ab-
solute precision. Hence even for a macroscopic object O
the world at any given time t is only finitely differentiated
spacewise (that is, no finite region R is differentiated into
infinitely many regions Ri such that truth values exist for
all propositions pi).
The finite spatial differentiation of reality is one of the
most significant ontological implications of QM [22, 43].
It is as inconsistent with the field-theoretic notion that
physical properties are instantiated by the “points of
space”3 as special relativity is with the notion of ab-
solute simultaneity. The world is created top-down, by
a finite process of differentiation that stops short of an
infinite spatial differentiation, rather than built bottom-
up, on an infinitely and intrinsically differentiated space,
out of locally instantiated physical properties. There are
no points on which to build such a world. An infinitely
and intrinsically differentiated space, such as IR3 is com-
monly supposed to represent, exists nowhere but in our
thoughts. We may think of the trajectories of macro-
scopic objects as the paths of average (expected) posi-
tions, but the fuzziness implied by this way of thinking
exists solely in our imagination. It corresponds to noth-
ing in the physical world because it exists only in relation
to an unrealized degree of spatial differentiation—it ex-
ists only in relation to an imagined backdrop that is more
differentiated spacewise than is the physical world.
What is true of the world’s spatial aspect is equally true
of its temporal aspect. There is no such thing as an intrin-
sically and infinitely differentiated time. What is tempo-
rally differentiated is physical systems, and every physical
system is temporally differentiated only to the extent that
it has distinct successive states, in the common-language
sense of “state” that connotes possessed properties. The
world’s limited temporal differentiation is a direct conse-
quence of its limited spatial differentiation. Because the
world is only finitely differentiated spacewise, no physical
system can have an infinite number of distinct states in a
finite time span T . Therefore a macroscopic clock (usu-
ally indicating time by some macroscopic pointer) can
indicate no more than a finite number of distinct times
during T , and this means that there exist no more than
a finite number of such times during T .
3“A field theory in physics is a theory which associates certain
properties with every point of space and time.”—M. Redhead [45].
Consider a system S to which, on the basis of its factu-
ally warranted properties at the indicated clock times t1
and t2, the respective Born probability measures |ψ1(t)〉
and |ψ2(t)〉 can be assigned. If there isn’t any fact that
indicates what S is like in the meantime then there isn’t
anything that S is like in the meantime. Where S is con-
cerned, there isn’t any state (in the common-language
sense of the word) that obtains in the meantime, let alone
an evolving instantaneous state. “[T]here is no interpo-
lating wave function giving the ‘state of the system’ be-
tween measurements” [46]. Not only is there no state
that obtains in the meantime but also there is no mean-
time. And so there isn’t any time at which propensities
can be attributed to S. Times, like properties, supervene
on the facts. Not only the positions of things but also
the times at which they are possessed are extrinsic. The
times that exist for S are the factually warranted times
at which S possesses factually warranted properties.
If there isn’t any matter of fact about what S is like in
the meantime, we can say that S has changed from an ob-
ject having properties that warrant assigning |ψ1(t)〉 to an
object having properties that warrant assigning |ψ2(t)〉—
but only in the sense that at the time t1 the system has
the former properties and at t2 it has the latter proper-
ties. The change of S consists in the difference between
the properties it possesses at t1 and the properties it pos-
sesses at t2. Where S is concerned, this is all the change
that occurs. Nothing can be said about the meantime,
not just because in the meantime S lacks properties, but
because there isn’t any meantime. (Much the same is
true of positions between material objects. If a position
somewhere between two material objects is not possessed
by another material object, it does not exist.)
Stapp’s 1972 interpretation of the Copenhagen inter-
pretation combines one correct idea with two erroneous
notions [47]:
The rejection of classical theory in favor of
quantum theory represents, in essence, the re-
jection of the idea that external reality resides
in, or inheres in, a space-time continuum. It sig-
nalizes the recognition that ‘space,’ like color,
lies in the mind of the beholder.
The principal difficulty in understanding quan-
tum theory lies in the fact that its completeness
is incompatible with [the] external existence of
the space-time continuum of classical physics.
The theoretical structure did not extend down
and anchor itself on fundamental microscopic
space-time realities. Instead it turned back and
anchored itself in the concrete sense realities
that form the basis of social life.
While it is correct that QM is incompatible with the
space-time continuum of classical physics, the conclusion
that space “lies in the mind of the beholder” is a non se-
quitur, and so is the notion that the theoretical structure
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of QM is anchored in “concrete sense realities.” What
is inconsistent with QM is the existence of an intrinsi-
cally and infinitely differentiated space-time continuum.
Neither space nor time is a world constituent that exists
independently of matter. Therefore neither can be intrin-
sically differentiated. Space and time are modes of differ-
entiation. The objective world is in possession of spatial
and temporal aspects, but it is only finitely differentiated
spacewise and timewise. Again, QM presupposes mea-
surements, but measurements qua value-indicating facts,
not measurements qua “concrete sense realities.”
In his present theory, Stapp rejects the one correct in-
gredient in his 1972 interpretation and postulates, as the
arena for a local dynamical process satisfying the princi-
ple of local causality, the infinitely and intrinsically dif-
ferentiated space-time continuum of relativistic quantum
field theory:
The evolution of the physical universe involves
three related processes. The first is the deter-
ministic evolution of the state of the physical
universe. It is controlled by the Schro¨dinger
equation of relativistic quantum field theory.
This process is a local dynamical process, with
all the causal connections arising solely from in-
teractions between neighboring localized micro-
scopic elements.
As pointed out earlier in this section, these field theoretic
notions are as inconsistent with the finite differentiation
of the objective world implied by QM as the notion of
absolute simultaneity is with special relativity.
10 QUANTUM MECHANICS AND
MIND–BRAIN INTERACTION
On the basis of von Neumann’s discordant postulates—
a classical space-time continuum, a dynamical process
subject to local causality, instantaneous collapse due to
the injection of “information associated with a subjective
perception by some observing system into the objective
state of the universe” [14]—Stapp formulates a theory of
mind–brain interaction in which choices are claimed to
play a crucial role: “The basic building blocks of the new
conception of nature are. . . choices of questions and an-
swers.” We freely choose the questions, and Nature freely
chooses the answers, within the constraints imposed by
the statistical laws of QM.
Like Bohr, Stapp attributes to experimenters the free-
dom to choose between complementary experimental ar-
rangements: “the choice of which question will be put
to nature. . . is not governed by the physical laws of con-
temporary physics.” Here I agree. The eventual physical
effect of such a choice—the experimental setup that is ac-
tually in place—is not determined by any of the presently
known physical laws, nor is the initial physical effect,
which causes, in accordance with the neuroscience of mo-
tor control, the actions that lead to the eventual effect.
Just as a specific event in classical physics always leads,
under identical conditions, to the same effect, so a spe-
cific, causally efficacious plan of action always leads to
a specific, causally determined course of action. It is
precisely because there is no indeterminacy in the corre-
lations between causes and effects that we can speak of
“causes” and “effects.” Since causal concepts are applica-
ble only to dispersion-free correlations, quantum indeter-
minacy can play no mediating role in mental causation.
The freedom to choose is a classical phenomenon. The
difference between physical causation and mental causa-
tion is that the causes of the former, like their effects,
belong to the classical domain, while the causes of the
latter are not to be found in either physical domain.
The description of the physical effects of mental causes
cannot differ from the description of the physical effects
of physical causes. The effects of mental causation must
be capable of being represented by the same mathemat-
ical constructs as the effects of physical causation—that
is, by one of the classical force fields. As has been shown
elsewhere [15, 16], the relevant field is the electromag-
netic four-vector potential. Where this is only physically
determined, it is determined (up to gauge transforma-
tions) in conformity with Maxwell’s equations. Where it
includes the effects of causally efficacious mental events,
it is no longer so determined.
Stapp asserts that “[a]ccording to the principles of clas-
sical physical theory, consciousness makes no difference in
behavior: all behavior is determined by microscopic cau-
sation.” In point of fact, this is so according to certain
metaphysical doctrines, not according to the principles of
any physical theory. Consciousness can make a difference,
although not without infringing physical laws [15, 16].
Like J.C. Eccles [13], Stapp appears to hope that QM
will allow the mind to be causally efficacious without
infringing physical laws. While Eccles tried, unsuccess-
fully [15, 16], to exploit quantum-mechanical indetermin-
ism as a loophole through which mind can act on matter
without “violating” the laws of physics, Stapp tries to ex-
plain the freedom of the experimenter by the freedom of
the experimenter’s mind to pay or not to pay attention.
His argument involves the following seven steps.
(1) Environment-induced decoherence (EID) [48] “creates
a powerful tendency for the brain to transform almost in-
stantly into an ensemble of components, each of which is
very similar to an entire classically-described brain” [14].
Two comments. First, the transformation to which Stapp
refers is not a transformation of the brain but the “trans-
formation” of a probability measure associated with one
time into a probability measure associated with another,
slightly later time. If the prior probability measure asso-
ciated with the brain and the time t is a coherent super-
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or a mixture of such superpositions
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j
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i
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the effect of EID is that the prior probability measure
associated with the brain and a slightly later time t′ is
approximately given by the mixture
∑
k
c∗kck|k〉〈k|
or the mixture (of mixtures)
∑
j
λj
∑
k
c∗jkcjk|k〉〈k|.
Second, if there is a way of making sense of the phrase
“classically described brain” (CDB), the phrase refers to
a brain the positional indefiniteness of whose material
constituents is not evidenced by such position-indicating
facts as are inconsistent with classical laws of motion
(Sec. 8).
(2) Each instance of EID in the brain is preceded and
brought into play by exocytosis, the release of the con-
tents of a vesicle of neurotransmitter into the synaptic
cleft.
The prior probability measure associated with the brain
after exocytosis assigns significant probabilities to sig-
nificantly different outcomes of position measurements
that might be performed on some of the brain’s material
constituents. “Significantly different” is short for “suf-
ficiently different for the probability measure associated
with the brain to be subject to EID.” The net result,
according to Stapp, is “a quantum splitting of the brain
into different classically describable components” or el-
ements, all of which must be regarded as real “because
interference between the different elements [is] in princi-
ple possible.”
In point of fact, the net result of exocytosis and EID is
a mixed probability measure. As a macroscopic object, a
CDB is associated with a probability measure that does
not assign significant probabilities to significantly differ-
ent outcomes of possible position measurements on its
material constituents. For this reason we can switch from
conditional assignments of probabilities to unconditional
attributions of properties (that is, to attributions of in-
trinsic properties); we can talk facts. That is just why we
can speak of a “classically described” brain. A “mixture
of CDBs,” on the other hand, has no sensible transla-
tion into the classical language of objects and facts. It
is neither an object nor an actual state of affairs but a
probability measure pure and simple.
If there isn’t any matter of fact about which compo-
nent of a mixture exists, no component exists. None
of them can be “regarded as real.” This is the reason
why re-interference remains a theoretical possibility. If
nothing in the decoherence-inducing environment indi-
cates a particular component, coherence can in principle
be restored. Since correlations between the respective
probability measures of the environment and the brain
are necessary but not sufficient for the existence of a
component-indicating fact, the probability measure as-
sociated with the brain at a later time could in princi-
ple be the initial pure measure, assuming that the initial
measure was pure. Whether this is possible under con-
ditions in which a living brain can exist, is a different
matter. It stands to reason that under such conditions
the decoherence-inducing environment intersects with the
classical domain. If so, the existing component will be
indicated, in which case the restoration of coherence is
ruled out.
A decoherent mixture can be objective in the sense that
it specifies objective probabilities. (I agree with Stapp
that decoherence is not sufficient for the transformation
of objective probabilities into subjective ones.) As ex-
plained in Sec. 7, objective probabilities are associated
with the possible results of unperformed measurements.
An objective probability measure is the proper, counter-
factual expression of an objective indefiniteness. If noth-
ing indicates the slit taken by an electron, an objective
probability of 1/2 can be assigned to the possibility that
the electron has gone through the left (right) slit. In
this case saying that the electron went through the left
(right) slit is neither true nor false. It is meaningless,
for the distinction we make between these alternatives is
a distinction that Nature does not make; it corresponds
to nothing in the physical world; it exists solely in our
minds.
In view of the unavoidable intersection between the
decoherence-inducing environment and the classical do-
main, a mixture of living CDBs can only be a subjective
probability measure, arising from an incomplete knowl-
edge of the relevant facts. It cannot represent the objec-
tive brain. Let us assume, nevertheless, that a “mixture
of CDBs” is an objective probability measure. (Only in
this case does it make sense to keep looking for a process
that changes “and” into “or,” or objective probabilities
into subjective ones, and in which consciousness can play
a causal role.) Then this objective probability measure is
the formal expression of an objective indefiniteness, and
the distinctions that we make between its components are
distinctions that Nature does not make; they correspond
to nothing in the physical world. Hence even if a “mix-
ture of CDBs” were an objective probability measure, its
components could not be regarded as being both real and
distinct from each other.
(3) “[D]uring an interval of conscious thinking, the brain
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changes by an alternation between two processes.” Hav-
ing generated “by a local deterministic mechanical rule” a
“profusion” of “separate, but equally real, quasi-classical
branches,” the “individual physical system associated
with a mental event” undergoes a change by which it “is
brought into alignment with the content of that mental
event.” The physical aspect of this second process “chops
off all branches that are incompatible with the associated
psychical aspect.”
“[I]f the psychical event is the experiencing of some
feature of the physical world, then the associated physi-
cal event” updates “the brain’s representation of that as-
pect of the physical world. This updating of the (quan-
tum) brain is achieved by discarding from the ensem-
ble of quasi-classical brain states all those branches in
which the brain’s representation of the physical world is
incompatible with the information content of the psychi-
cal event” [14].
If the psychical event is the intention to execute a par-
ticular plan of action, then the associated physical event
discards the branches associated with plans of action that
are incompatible with the experienced intention. (Stapp
assumes that “the purely mechanical evolution of the
state of the brain in accordance with the Schro¨dinger
equation will normally cause the brain to evolve into a
growing ensemble of alternative branches, each of which
is essentially an entire classically described brain that
specifies a possible plan of action.”)
Holding the definiteness of perceptions responsible
for the quantum-mechanical “reduction process” permits
Stapp to pass from perceptions to other mental contents,
and to similarly empower volitions: The definiteness of
intentions, like that of perceptions, entails reductions. As
yet, however, there is no room for free choices. Conscious-
ness (a psychical aspect of perceptual and/or volitional
character) is associated with all branches, and reduction
occurs automatically whenever the mixture of branches
becomes inconsistent with the definiteness of mental con-
tents. To make room for free choices, Stapp introduces
the metaphor of the experimenter as interrogator of Na-
ture. Making experiments is asking questions, and get-
ting results is receiving answers from Nature. The exper-
imenter has the freedom to choose which experiments to
perform when, and Nature has the freedom to chose the
results.
(4) “The central roles in quantum theory of these discrete
choices—the choices of which questions will be put to na-
ture, and which answer nature delivers—makes quantum
theory a theory of discrete events. . . . Each of these quan-
tum events involves” (i) “a choice of a Yes-No question
by the mind–brain system” and (ii) “a choice by Nature
of an answer, either Yes or No, to that question. . . . the
freedom to choose which questions are put to nature, and
when they are asked, allows mind to influence the be-
haviour of the brain” [14].
Within the Copenhagen framework, the interrogation of
Nature by human experimenters is a fitting metaphor for
a well-defined scenario. To choose a question is to decide
on a specific experimental arrangement, and to choose a
time is to decide when to perform the experiment. The
mind, however, doesn’t experiment with the brain. To
save his metaphor, Stapp therefore needs to imbue it with
a new sense. In what sense does the mind put questions
to the brain, without the intervention of an apparatus?
How does it choose its questions and the times to ask
them? In Stapp’s opinion, attention holds the key.
(5) “Asking a question about something is closely con-
nected to focussing one’s attention on it. Attending to
something is the act of directing one’s mental power to
some task. This task might be to update one’s repre-
sentation of some feature of the surrounding world, or
to plan or execute some other sort of mental or physical
action.”
Neurobiological data suggest that the world’s neural rep-
resentation contains far more information than its con-
scious mental representation, and this suggests that at-
tention plays a crucial role in the relation between the two
representations. Sudden changes in the visual field can
not only draw attention, and thereby update the mental
representation, but also draw it away, and thereby oblit-
erate features of this representation [49]. (The updating
of the mental representation that would normally follow a
change in the neural representation, may be prevented by
focusing attention on a different part of the visual field.)
When it is not drawn willy-nilly, attention seems to be
capable of being directed freely. According to William
James, whom Stapp quotes approvingly, the power to di-
rect our attention is limited to choices between keeping
it focused on whatever has captured it or allowing it to
be captured by something else:
[T]he whole drama of the voluntary life hinges
on the attention, slightly more or slightly less,
which rival motor ideas may receive.
The essential achievement of the will, in short,
when it is most “voluntary,” is to attend to a
difficult object and hold it fast before the mind.
. . . Effort of attention is thus the essential phe-
nomenon of will [50].
While this appears to be both plausible and consistent
with the neurobiological data, it has nothing to do with
probabilistic reductions of mixtures. The questions the
mind can put to the brain, by choosing where to fix
its attention, are always compatible, for the mind does
not need to choose between mutually incompatible ex-
perimental arrangements. The relations between mental
contents and neural states, in which attention appears to
play a significant role, are therefore relations between the
mind and a CDB, which belongs to the definite domain
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of intrinsic properties. It has nothing to do with the re-
lations between this domain and the indefinite domain of
extrinsic properties, with which QM is concerned. The
intersection between QM and volition is empty.
I do not deny that a complete understanding of the
brain must take into account the positional indefinite-
ness (and hence the quantum-mechanical nature) of the
brain’s constituents. But of this there can be no evidence
in the correspondences between facts and their neural
and mental representations. If attention is drawn to the
highest bidder, the highest bidder is not a component of
a mixture of CDBs but one among several neural events
or activities competing for attention in one and the same
CDB. And if attention roams freely (that is, if the mind
can freely choose the questions it puts to the brain) then
also there is nothing stochastic in the answers it receives.
Each answer is determined by a definite aspect of a sin-
gle CDB, rather than by the probabilistic reduction of a
mixture of CDBs.
(6) The interactions between the physical universe and
the minds of observers have two aspects. The first “is the
role of the experimenter in choosing what to attend to;
which aspect of nature he wants to probe; which question
he wants to ask about the physical world. . . . The second
aspect is the recognition, or coming to know, the answer
that nature returns” [14].
Here Stapp glosses over the disparity between physical
experimentation and psychological attention by applying
the same metaphor to both. In point of fact, experi-
menters do not choose what to attend to; they decide
which experiment they will perform. It is one thing to
choose between incompatible experimental arrangements
with a view to obtaining information about a part of the
physical world that cannot be obtained by simply look-
ing at it. It is something else altogether to choose which
directly accessible feature of a CDB to attend to. (“Di-
rectly accessible” means “without the intervention of any
apparatus” and thus “without having to chose between
incompatible setups.”) The necessity of a choice exists
for totally different reasons, namely, in one case, the im-
possibility of simultaneous answers to logically inconsis-
tent questions4 and, in the other case, the brain’s limited
processing capacity.
Stapp’s transference, via the interrogator metaphor, of
the non-Boolean structure of the lattice of possible ex-
perimental answers to the lattice of possible answers re-
turned by the brain seems to entail that different plans of
actions necessarily correspond to different components of
a mixture of CDBs. If this were the case, we could never
consciously weigh the pros and cons of different possible
4It is not only practically impossible but logically inconsistent
to ask both (i) whether an atom went through the left or through
the right cavity and (ii) whether the same atom went through both
cavities in phase or out of phase. See my discussion [22, 51] of the
experiment of Englert, Scully, and Walther [52, 53].
courses of action, for then different plans of action could
not coexist in the same mind, given that consciousness of
a plan of action is what reduces the mixture to one of its
components. To be consistent with the introspectively
evident coexistence of alternative plans of action in the
same mind, Stapp would have to allow either that differ-
ent courses of actions can coexist in the same CDB or that
we can be conscious of different components of a mixture
of CDBs. But in the former case the choice between alter-
native plans of action cannot be linked to the reduction of
a mixture, and in the latter Stapp’s consciousness-based
account of state reduction fails.
If the brain’s limited processing capacity is the reason
why attention is choosy then attention has to be regarded
as being in part a neural process. This works in Stapp’s
favor inasmuch as he wants to account for the causal ef-
ficacy of the mind in quantum-mechanical terms. Since
no single choice of an experiment can influence the re-
sult of another experiment, no single question posed by
the mind can be causally efficacious. On this theoretical
foundation it makes sense to let the physical system de-
cide which questions will be asked when, and to restrict
the mind’s freedom to an influence on the rate at which
questions are re-posed. This kind of influence can be
causally efficacious, as the quantum Zeno effect [54, 55]
demonstrates, and it agrees with the fact that attention
is largely a neural (and hence neurally determined) pro-
cess. But it also gives the quietus to the interrogator
metaphor, for now Nature not only provides the answers
but also asks the questions.
By gradually shifting both the content and the appli-
cation of his metaphor, Stapp is able to make plausible
a series of specious transitions. Once the metaphor has
served its purpose, it is discarded. In the first of the
quotations that follow, Stapp attributes to the mind the
freedom to choose its questions. In the second, the mind
chooses between whether or not to pose a question cho-
sen by Nature, and it controls the rate of questioning. In
the third, the mind only controls the rate at which ques-
tions chosen by Nature are repeated. And in the fourth,
the mind’s freedom is reduced to consenting to the rapid
re-posing of questions chosen by Nature.
The only freedom in the theory—insofar as we
leave Nature’s choices alone—is the choice made
by the individual about which question it will
ask next, and when it will ask it. These are
the only inputs of mind to the dynamics of the
brain.
[T]he brain does most of the work, in a local
mechanical way, and the mind, simply by means
of choices between ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ options, and
control over the rate at which questions are put
to nature, merely gives top-level guidance.
Mental control comes in only through the option
to rapidly pose [the] same question repeatedly,
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thus activating the Quantum Zeno Effect, which
will tend to keep the state of the brain focussed
on [a specific] plan of action. . . .
[M]ind, by means of the limited effect of con-
senting to the rapid re-posing of the question
already constructed and briefly presented by
brain, can influence brain activity by causing
this activity to stay focussed on the presented
course of action.
According to Stapp, if we are very intent on a specific
course of action, we must be very skeptical about its be-
ing the right course of action; we must keep asking our-
selves rapidly, “Shall I execute plan X? Shall I execute
plan X? Shall I. . . .” This will make our executing plan X
highly probable. On the other hand, if we wish to abstain
from a certain course of action, we must not keep asking
ourselves whether it should be executed.
(7) Stapp presents a simple dynamical model of mind–
brain interaction in which “the ‘best possible’ question
that could be asked by the individual at time t,” given
the state S(t) of the universe at this time, is the ques-
tion Pmax that maximizes Tr[PS(t)]. This question is
posed when the probability of a positive answer reaches
a relative maximum.
Here Stapp introduces a new physical law, specifying
which question Nature will ask herself next and when she
will do so. Stapp thus effectively proposes a new theory,
as different from standard QM as nonlinear adulterations
of QM [23, 24]. The theory which he ends up formulating
is completely different from the theory he initially pro-
fesses to formulate, for in the beginning consciousness is
responsible for state vector reductions, while in the end
a new physical law is responsible—a law that in no wise
depends on the presence of consciousness.
Thus in the end Stapp, like Eccles [13], fails to account
for mental causation without implying “violations” of the
laws of contemporary physics. Eccles did not introduce
a new physical law, but he allowed the mind to load the
quantum dice in the process of exocytosis, and this is tan-
tamount to postulating mentally generated local modifi-
cations of physical laws [15, 16]. Stapp introduces a new
physical law specifying which questions Nature asks her-
self, and when, and he allows the mind to modify the
rates at which Nature interrogates herself. This, too, is
tantamount to postulating mentally generated local mod-
ifications of a physical law—the very law Stapp himself
has introduced.
11 EPILOGUE
Stapp asserts that his “conceptualization of natural pro-
cess arises. . . directly from an examination of the mathe-
matical structure injected into science by our study of the
structure of the relationships between our experiences.”
It is a truism that science begins with relationships be-
tween experiences. But it does not end there. Science is
driven by the desire to know how things really are. It owes
its immense success in large measure to its powerful “sus-
taining myth” [56]—the belief that this can be discovered.
Knowing how things “really” are does not mean knowing
how they are in themselves, independently of how they
appear to us or how we conceive of them. By definition,
that kind of knowledge is beyond our ken. What science
aims to achieve is a strongly objective conception of re-
ality (that is, a consistent way of thinking of experienced
regularities as aspects of a world that does not depend
on its being experienced). The very aim of science thus
rules out the intersubjective or weakly objective concep-
tion of reality advocated by d’Espagnat [57]. It also rules
out interpretations of standard QM that take the quan-
tum state for more than a probability measure, inasmuch
as such interpretations are inconsistent with strong ob-
jectivity [57, 58, 59, 60]. It further rules out epistemic
interpretations, including Stapp’s.
If the aim of strong objectivity appears unattainable,
it ought to be taken as a sign that we are making the
wrong assumptions, and it ought to spur us on to fer-
ret them out. The crucial assumption that stands in the
way of a strongly objective conception of reality based
on von Neumann’s formulation of QM is the idea that
the “evolution” of the physical state of the universe “be-
tween events” is “a local dynamical process, with all the
causal connections arising solely from interactions be-
tween neighboring localized microscopic elements” [14].
For Stapp, reality is differentiated, both spacewise and
timewise, into infinitesimal “neighboring localized micro-
scopic elements.” If the objective physical state is “an in-
formational and dispositional substrate that carries both
the information incorporated into it by the psychical real-
ities, and certain dispositions for the occurrence of future
psychical realities” [14], this locality assumption is com-
pletely gratuitous. The temporal resolution of the human
visual system is in the millisecond range; its angular reso-
lution is about an arc minute. Though higher resolutions
can be achieved with the help of physical instruments,
owing to intrinsic limits to the spatial and temporal mag-
nifying power of such instruments, infinitesimal neigh-
boring intervals or regions can never be distinguished.
But if “psychical realities” are only finitely differentiated
spacewise and timewise, and if the physical state of the
universe only “carries information” about past “psychical
realities” and propensities for future “psychical realities,”
then why should the physical universe be infinitely dif-
ferentiated?
The recognition that the physical world is only finitely
differentiated spacewise and timewise (Sec. 9) clears the
way for a rigorous objective distinction between the clas-
sical domain of intrinsic properties and the quantum do-
main of extrinsic properties (Sec. 8). It warrants the spe-
cial status Bohr accorded to measurement outcomes—
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property-indicating facts—and makes it possible to es-
tablish an objective criterion for distinguishing measur-
ing apparatuses from “lesser things.” Essential to attain-
ing this objective was the realization that the attribution
of factuality is beyond the scope of any theory. When
the theory has done its part, we are left with the prob-
lem of assigning factuality. This problem has exactly one
solution. The inexplicable factuality of facts belongs to
those properties which, for all quantitative purposes, can
be treated as intrinsic.
Instead of according a special status to measuring in-
struments, Stapp accords it to the neural correlates of
mental states. Mental states evolve classically. The quan-
tum brain does not, but the definiteness of mental states
forces their neural correlates, and through them every-
thing that is entangled with them, to behave in a classi-
cal manner. In order to turn his idea of a theory into a
proper theory, Stapp would have to establish a criterion
for distinguishing the neural correlates of mental states
from less exalted aspects of the brain. If we are to reject
the Copenhagen interpretation because it fails to estab-
lish a criterion for distinguishing measuring instruments,
we should equally reject Stapp’s theory, for it fails to es-
tablish a criterion for distinguishing the neural correlates
of mental states. He does, however, venture the following
conjecture:
This suggests to me that the physical correlates
of the psychical realities will reside in the low
frequency components of the coulomb part of
the electromagnetic field. These are dominated
by the so-called “coherent states,” which are
known to be essentially classical in nature, and
particularly robust. . . . This would allow psy-
chical realities. . . to be present in the simplest
life forms, and to predate life [14].
The attempt to identify the neural correlates of con-
sciousness in physical terms appears to lead more or less
inevitably to some form of panpsychism. This suggests to
me that John Searle’s comment on David Chalmers’ func-
tionalist account of consciousness [61] applies equally to
Stapp’s account: “Of all the absurd results in Chalmers’
book, panpsychism is the most absurd and provides us
with a clue that something is radically wrong with the
thesis that implies it” [62].
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